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Abstract
Swiss climate policy consists of three regulatory instruments for greenhouse
gas emissions reduction: A CO2 levy, the Swiss Emissions Trading System (CH
EHS), and an additional “nonEHS” program for medium-sized plants that consists
of command-and-control elements plus a sizeable abatement subsidy. Our paper in-
forms about this tripartite climate policy, which is unique in the international con-
text. Second, we estimate the differential impact of the CH EHS and the nonEHS
program on plants’ emissions. Our empirical strategy exploits a policy change in
2013 that instituted a mandatory emissions trading system for a subset of previously
regulated firms. We find that the nonEHS outperforms the CH EHS for a minority
of plants, but that on average, the two programs result in similar abatement efforts
despite very different financial incentives. Firms that previously engaged in abate-
ment efforts continue to do so even after the financial incentives were reduced by an
order of magnitude. Our results suggest the presence of preferences for abatement
per se, above and beyond financial incentives. They further imply that expanding
the nonEHS system at the expense of the CO2 levy may be associated with signifi-
cant costs but no additional emission reductions.
Policy insights
• We identify no difference between the emissions reductions of firms regulated
by cap-and-trade vs. an abatement subsidy in Switzerland
• Exempting firms from paying an emissions tax can likely not be justified by a
superior performance of a subsidy
• The costs of climate policy should not be concentrated on households and
small firms
Keywords: Climate policy, emissions tax, carbon tax, emissions trading, subsidies,
command-and-control, Switzerland.
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1 Introduction
Switzerland uses a mix of policy instruments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In 2008,
a CO2 levy was introduced on fossil combustion fuels. This levy was gradually increased
to the current level of CHF 96 per tCO2 equivalents,
1 making it one of the highest carbon
taxes worldwide. Not all greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels are subject to the CO2
levy. Importantly, transportation fuels have been exempt. Furthermore, to protect the
interests of energy-intensive firms, the Swiss government has established two programs
that allow firms and individual plants to be exempt from the CO2 levy. The first program
was established in 2008 and can be described as a command-and-control instrument that
is combined with generous abatement subsidy. To join, firms in certain subsectors that
have sufficiently high annual emissions can develop abatement measures and emissions
targets and submit these for approval to the federal government. This program is known
today under the label nonEHS.2
In 2013, the federal government additionally introduced an emissions trading scheme,
called the CH EHS. This system is identical to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU
ETS) in all relevant aspects and has been designed with a view to linking it with the
EU system. The link was delayed for several years for political reasons but finally took
place in January 2020. Plants subject to the CH EHS are also exempt from the CO2
levy. Besides the threefold regulation of CO2 on the federal level, there are also cantonal
regulations that affect the energy use of plants and thus, indirectly, their emissions.
In this paper, we exploit the sequential introduction of the nonEHS and the EHS
programs to measure their differential impact on plant emissions. More specifically, we
focus on a set of plants that joined the nonEHS program in 2008. Among these, a subset
was transferred to the CH EHS in 2013, whereas the others remained in the nonEHS
program. This allows for the identification of the differential effect of these programs in
a causal sense using a difference-in-differences framework.
Because the abatement subsidy in the nonEHS program has always been higher than
1The Swiss Franc is currently at parity with the US Dollar.
2EHS is the German acronym for Emissionshandelssystem, or emissions trading scheme (ETS).
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the allowance price in the CH EHS, neoclassical economics predicts a negative treatment
effect of the EHS on abatement, i.e., a positive effect on emissions. We do find such
a positive effect, but only for about a quarter of the included plants that had both
relatively low revenue and did not engage in significant emissions reduction during the pre-
treatment period. For all other plants, the treatment effect is not statistically significantly
different from zero. Our results suggest that financial incentives matter, but that other
aspects (such as green preferences) may also be important drivers of firms’ production
and abatement decisions.
Empirically evaluating the effect of the different climate policy instruments is difficult.
Since everyone is affected, either by the levy or one of the two exemption programs, no
valid control group exists to cleanly identify the effect of a single policy. Furthermore, the
fuel use of firms and households subject to the levy is only recorded on aggregate.3 Betz
et al. (2015) provide qualitative arguments as to why the multiplicity of policies makes
it difficult to achieve Switzerland’s overall emissions target, but without quantitatively
assessing the effectiveness of the individual policies.
The previous empirical research about the effectiveness of Swiss climate policy is con-
fined to before-vs-after studies (Ecoplan, 2015, 2017), surveys of the involved firms (TEP
Energy, 2016) and engineering estimates (Ecoplan, 2015; EnAW, 2019). Both the levy
and the nonEHS program were found to have significantly reduced emissions, whereas the
same is not clear for the CH EHS (SFAO, 2017). However, these results may be driven by
unobserved heterogeneity or self-selection into the nonEHS program, as larger firms were
both more likely to reduce their emissions and to apply for an exemption via nonEHS.
Although a clean identification of the effect of each program would clearly be prefer-
able, the differential impact is nevertheless interesting. There is an ongoing debate in
Switzerland about whether the nonEHS program should be extended to include smaller
plants. Because shifting plants to a subsidies program will result in higher costs, such
a move would have to be justified by a superior performance of the nonEHS program in
3The levy is imposed on fossil fuels as they cross the border and thus simply becomes a part of the
overall price. Individual purchases are only recorded if firms claim the exemption from the levy, which is
then returned to them.
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terms of emissions reductions relative to a tax. We cannot test for this directly. However,
to the extent that an emissions levy of CHF 96 can be expected to achieve at least as
much in terms of abatement as a cap-and-trade system with an allowance price of CHF
10, our results indicate that the nonEHS program is unlikely to outperform the levy.
Our analysis contributes to the political discussion about climate policy, in particular
in Switzerland, but potentially also in other countries that use a combination of different
climate policy instruments that provide different marginal incentives for abatement.
More broadly speaking, our paper contributes to the literature on overlapping instru-
ments for climate change. Even though economists typically prescribe the use of a (single)
Pigovian tax on emissions in order to internalize climate-related emission externalities,
almost all countries use a range of instruments such that firms are subject to more than
one emissions policy. This is usually viewed as problematic (see, e.g., Fankhauser et al.,
2010), but it could be justified by market failures in addition to the climate externality
(Fischer and Preonas, 2010), uncertainty about the future climate policy (Lecuyer and
Quirion, 2013) or private information (Krysiak and Oberauner, 2010). Overlapping in-
struments are usually explained using political-economy considerations (Jenkins, 2014).
For example, they can be the the result of interest groups successfully lobbying for subsi-
dies in addition to, or instead of, carbon pricing (Brandt and Svendsen, 2004; Hieronymi
and Schüller, 2015). Multiple policies may also be due to the interaction between dif-
ferent levels of government, which may result in the simultaneous pursuit of bottom-up
and top-down approaches to regulation (Solorio and Jörgens, 2017). Our paper is also
related to the literature that focuses on voluntary action against climate change on behalf
of firms (e.g., Pizer et al., 2011; Gans and Hintermann, 2013; Hsueh, 2019).
In the next section, we provide more background information. Section 3 describes our
identification strategy and the data and section 4 presents the results. Section 5 offers
concluding remarks.
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2 Background: Swiss climate policy
Swiss climate policy is based on the Federal Act on the Reduction of CO2 Emissions (“CO2
Act”),4 which has been updated several times since its inception in 2000. Originally, the
CO2 Act focused on meeting the commitment made for the Kyoto Protocol of reducing
overall GHG emissions by eight percent during the 2008 – 2012 period, relative to the
1990 baseline. It prescribes a variety of policy measures that were further specified in
different of action plans, programs and policies. The latest revision of the CO2 Act was
implemented on 1. 1. 2013. It updated the emission targets and policy measures for the
post-Kyoto period. More information about the revised CO2 Act and Swiss climate policy
can be found on the website of the Federal Office of the Environment (FOEN),5 and in
Hintermann and Zarkovic (2020). In what follows, we briefly describe those measures and
policies that are relevant to our context: (1) The CO2 levy for heating fuels, (2) the CH
EHS, (3) the nonEHS program and (4) cantonal regulation.
2.1 The CO2 Levy
Since 2008, Switzerland has imposed a CO2 levy on fossil heating and process fuels, such
as heating oil, natural gas, coal or petroleum coke, in order to incentivize a more efficient
use of fossil fuels and a transition to low-carbon energy sources. Transport fuels have
been exempted from the CO2 levy from the very beginning. Instead, a surcharge of one
cent/liter was added to all gasoline and diesel imports and the revenue is used to finance
GHG offsets in Switzerland and abroad.6 The levy is collected at the border crossing
(there are no fossil fuels produced in Switzerland). Two thirds of the collected revenue
is redistributed to taxpayers and firms, whereas the remainder is used to fund a building
energy efficiency program and a technology fund.
4This is known as “CO2 Gesetz” in German. SR 641.71, enacted on 23. 12. 2011. Currently, the CO2
Act is in the process of revision to shape climate policy for the years after 2020.
5https://www.bafu.admin.ch/bafu/en/home/topics/climate/info-specialists/
climate-policy.html (last accessed in January 2019)
6The surcharge has been increased to 4.5 cents/liter, but is not allowed to exceed the maximum level
of 5 cents per liter. At 2.3 kg of CO2 per liter of gasoline, the maximum surcharge translates to a
CO2 tax for transport fuels of 22 CHF/tCO2, which is only a fraction of the CO2 levy that applies to
combustion fuels. The exclusion of transport fuels from the CO2 levy was due to successful lobbying
efforts (Brönnimann et al., 2014).
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Table 1: CO2 levy and fuel prices, 2008-2018
Unit 2008 2009 2012 2014 2016 2018
CO2 levy [CHF/tCO2] 12 24 36 60 84 96
Heating oil EL
Market price
[CHF/kg]
0.990 0.560 0.894 0.766 0.385 0.612
Surcharge 0.038 0.076 0.114 0.190 0.265 0.303
Natural gas
Market price
[CHF/kg]
0.519 0.240 0.394 0.334 0.201 0.347
Surcharge 0.032 0.064 0.096 0.160 0.224 0.256
Hard coal
Market price
[CHF/kg]
0.158 0.076 0.087 0.069 0.058 0.090
Surcharge 0.028 0.057 0.085 0.142 0.198 0.227
Propane
Market price
[CHF/kg]
0.836 0.510 0.811 0.617 0.286 0.532
Surcharge 0.036 0.072 0.108 0.179 0.251 0.287
Sources: Thomson Reuters and FOEN (2019b)
In order to provide firms and households with planning and investment security, the
CO2 Act defined interim reduction targets for emissions from thermal fuels, upon which
the rate of the levy was defined in advance. Non-attainment of the targets triggers
an automatic increase in the CO2 levy in multiples of CHF 12 per metric ton of CO2
equivalents. Table 1 shows the levy since its introduction, along with the (international)
exchange prices for four types of fuels and the corresponding surcharges due to the levy.
The current levy is CHF 96/tCO2. The existing CO2 Act defines a maximum level of
CHF 120/tCO2.
Figure 1 indicates that, unlike transport emissions, aggregate combustion emissions
have significantly decreased in Switzerland, suggesting that the CO2 Act has had some
effect. However, it is not clear to what extent each instrument of the Act has contributed
to the emissions reduction, including the effect of the subsidies that are financed with
the proceeds of the CO2 levy. Furthermore, a part of the decrease may have been due to
general technological progress, as the decrease in emissions started well before 2008.
A series of reports commissioned by FOEN (Ecoplan, 2015, 2017) estimate the effect of
the CO2 tax on firms and households by means of a time series analysis and a computable
general equilibrium model. The time-series analysis implies that for the years 2008-2015,
the levy led to a reduction of 6.9 million tons of CO2, which corresponds to 4.4% of the
6
Figure 1: Aggregate emissions from combustion and transportation
Source: FOEN, Swiss greenhouse gas inventory
combustion emissions during that period.7 The results from the CGE model are somewhat
lower, but on a similar order of magnitude. Figure 2 presents the estimates from the time-
series model, which imply that the CO2 levy had a significant effect on emissions. This
analysis relies on the assumption that the time trend of business-as-usual emissions before
the introduction of the tax also applies to the trend after the introduction.
2.2 The nonEHS program
For the purposes of our analysis, we assume that the nonEHS program was instituted in
2008 with the start of the CO2 Act.
8 Firms from sectors of the economy that have a high
emissions tax burden in relation to their value, and whose international competitiveness
would be significantly undermined as a result, can be exempted from paying the CO2
levy by participating in the nonEHS program. The exemption takes place on the plant
7Total GHG emissions in Switzerland in the years 2008-2015 amounted to 411 million tons
of CO2, of which 155 million tons were subject to the CO2 tax. Source: Swiss greenhouse
gas inventory, available at https://www.bafu.admin.ch/bafu/en/home/topics/climate/state/data/
greenhouse-gas-inventory.html.
8Technically, the nonEHS program was instituted only in 2013, along with the “new” CH EHS.
However, a program that was identical in all relevant aspects was introduced in 2008 by the CO2 Act
under the label ”CH EHS”. Despite its name, this “first-period” EHS was not a cap-and-trade system,
as there was no fixed cap. Like the current nonEHS program, it was based on emission intensities. It
also relied on mandatory abatement measures and contained an abatement subsidy. For these reasons,
we label both the first-period EHS and the current nonEHS program as nonEHS and refer only to the
post-2012 EHS as CH EHS.
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Figure 2: Effect of the CO2 levy on combustion emissions
Source: Ecoplan (2017); Translation by authors.
level. However, nonEHS participants can form groups, such that firms can aggregate their
included plants and participate as a single entity. To be eligible for the nonEHS, a plant
must be engaged in specific production activities and emit at least 100 tons CO2eq. in one
of the preceding two years. If the plant has an installed rated thermal input exceeding 20
MW, it is automatically included in the CH EHS. Figure 3 provides an overview of the
eligibility rules from the CO2 levy.
To initiate the application process, a firm develops a set of specific emissions measures
and reduction goals in cooperation with one of two specialized business associations, the
“Energie-Agentur der Wirtschaft” (EnAW) and “Cleantech Agentur Schweiz” (ACT).9
Firms then submit this abatement plan to FOEN, along with an application for exemption
from the CO2 levy. If approved, the plan forms the basis for a formal target agreement
between the firm and FOEN. Firms must comply with this agreement in order to become
(and remain) exempt from the CO2 tax.
Only abatement measures that are deemed “economically viable” are included in the
agreements. For production and processing facilities, this means that the investment
9There are two “flavors” of this program. The first is based on specific emissions goals along with
abatement measures and applies to larger firms, whereas the second version only includes a definition of
measures that a firm has to implement. The “abatement measures” version is reserved for firms with
annual emissions of less than 1500 tonnes CO2 eq. per year. In this paper, we focus on the larger firms.
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Figure 3: Exemption from the CO2 levy
Source: FOEN. Translation by authors.
should be recovered within four years, given the investment cost and the prevailing energy
and emissions prices. For investments in building insulation and heating equipment, the
required payback period is eight years (FOEN, 2018, p.80). The most popular measures
are related to lighting, heating, process optimization and ventilation (EnAW, 2019).
If firms performed better than their defined abatement path, they could sell the surplus
in the form of offsets to the Climate Cent Foundation (CCF) in 2008-2012, and to the
Foundation for Climate Protection and Carbon Offset (KliK) since 2013. The two founda-
tions used these “domestic” offsets, along with international Kyoto offsets, to compensate
emissions from various sources, and in particular from transport. The price paid by CCF
for offsets was determined in a series of auctions and ranged between 40 and 100 CHF per
ton of over-abatement.10 KliK pays a fixed price of CHF 100/tCO2 for offsets that have
been generated since 2013, and CHF 50/tCO2 for banked offsets generated before 2013.
CFC and KliK are financed by a fuel surcharge on transport fuels (see footnote 6). In
theory, the system is symmetric in the sense that firms could also purchase these domestic
offsets if they fall short of their goals. In practice, however, this never happens because
10The clearing prices paid per tCO2 were CHF 70 in 2007, CHF 100 in 2009 and CHF 40 in 2012
(Climate Cent Foundation, 2013).
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(i) the abatement goals are chosen such that they can be achieved with the mandatory
measures, (ii) shocks in product demand (and thus emissions) are neutralized by bench-
marking, (iii) firms were allowed to count a limited number of international offsets towards
achieving their emission targets (FOEN, 2019a) and (iv) to transfer emissions over time
such that a shortfall in one year can be offset by a surplus in the next. As a consequence,
nonEHS firms exclusively act as suppliers of domestic offsets, rendering this an explicit
abatement subsidy.11
A study commissioned by FOEN (TEP Energy, 2016) surveyed firms subject to the
tax or one of the exemption mechanisms with respect to climate-relevant decision making.
Exempt firms reported more abatement measures than firms paying the tax. However,
since larger firms (in terms of employees) and firms with a higher emission intensity were
both more likely to seek exemption and to engage in significant abatement measures, these
results could be explained by self-selection. Firms that chose not to apply for an exemption
explained this with the significant transaction costs associated with developing a target
agreement. Krysiak and Oberauner (2010) report a similar result for the introduction of
the nonEHS program, based on a theoretical model coupled with firm surveys: Firms with
a high emission intensity found it optimal (and indeed tended to choose) the exemption,
whereas firms with relatively low emissions paid the tax.
Based on the energy model that was used to identify the abatement targets, EnAW
(2019) estimates that the emission goals imply an increase in emissions intensity, relative
to the base year 2012, of 4.7% by 2018 and of 8.4% by 2022 (see Figure 4). However, firms
over-achieved these reduction goals, such that by 2018, the actual emission intensity had
been decreased by 11.7% (dashed line).
These numbers should be viewed with caution, however, as some of the involved abate-
ment measures would have happened anyway. An external evaluation concluded that
only 20%-40% of the emission reductions are caused by the agreement and the subsidies,
11In this section, we interpret the fuel surcharge as a tax that goes to the Federal government, which
also happens to subsidize nonEHS firms for abatement that otherwise would not happen. Conversely,
one could take the view that there is an emissions cap in the transport sector, and drivers pay with their
surcharge for the offsets generated by nonEHS firms. In that interpretation, there is no subsidy paid (as it
is a transfer from drivers to firms), but the offsets generated by nonEHS firms do not constitute additional
emission reductions (as they simply replace abatement that would have happened in the transport sector).
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whereas the remainder would have happened anyway (Ecoplan, 2016). EnAW (2019) ar-
gues that an important side effect of the target agreements is to increase the awareness
for environmental efficiency within the firm, which leads to the establishment of processes
and procedures to measure and reduce emissions.
Figure 4: Emission intensity for firms with emissions goals
Source: EnAW (2019)
Ecoplan (2016) estimated average abatement cost of the target agreement measures
to be CHF 26-69 CHF per tCO2. From 2008 to 2018, nonEHS firms emitted a total of
23.7 million tCO2. Multiplied with the levy that applied at the time of the emission,
this leads to a foregone tax revenue of CHF 1,017 million.12 In addition, the federal
government spent CHF 296 million to compensate firms for over-abatement. Besides these
monetary costs, additional costs accrue in the process of working out target agreements
and monitoring firms’ compliance. Overall, we conclude that the nonEHS has significantly
reduced emissions, but at a considerable cost.
12Because the revenue from the CO2 levy is returned, the federal government does not actually have
less money if another firm is exempt. However, returning the money is associated with a social benefit:
A third of the revenue is used to fund energy efficiency programs in the building sector, and distributing
the remaining two thirds to firms and households increases redistribution. The government thus loses the
ability to subsidize and redistribute income as a consequence of exempting more firms.
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2.3 The CH EHS
The CH EHS in its current form was introduced in 2013.13 All relevant parameters of
the revised system have been aligned with those in the EU. Participation in the CH
EHS is mandatory for plants with a total rated thermal input above 20 MW. Additional
thresholds apply to certain sectors based on production capacity. In sectors that tend to
be dominated by large installations (e.g., refining of mineral oil or production of steel), no
entry threshold is set, such that all plants are included. Due to the absence of fossil-based
power generation in Switzerland, the number of plants that fulfill these criteria is quite
low. Firms that have a an installed thermal input capacity between 10 and 20 MW are
allowed to opt into the EHS. This led to the inclusion of four additional plants, all of
which belong to firms that already had other plants in the CH EHS. Currently, the CH
EHS includes 53 plants belonging to 36 different firms.
The CH EHS uses harmonized allocation rules, which are based on the benchmarks of
emissions performance used in the EU ETS. These benchmarks depend on the physical
quantity of goods produced in the past or on heat input. About 95% of the cap is allocated
for free to EHS participants, whereas the remainder is retained as a reserve. Changes in
free allocation due to adjustments in production capacity, entries or exits do not affect
the overall cap, but are taken from (or added to) the reserve. Figure 5 shows the total
emissions cap (solid line), along with emissions and free allocation (bars).
Most of the installations belonging to manufacturing industries have more allowances
than they need to cover their emissions, whereas combined heat producers tend to be
under-allocated. In addition, firms are allowed to use a limited number of international
emissions reduction units.14
The unused allowance reserve is sold in the following year in bi-annual auctions. The
auction in May 2014 established the first price for CH EHS emission allowances (CHUs).
13As noted above, a previous version of the CH EHS was instituted in 2008. Since this was indistin-
guishable from the current nonEHS system in terms of the main program parameters, we refer to this
system as CH EHS only since its overhaul in 2013.
14Plants that were already exempt from the levy before 2013 were allowed to use a maximum of 11%
of their emissions target in 2008- 2012 for compliance in both phases. Plants that only joined the CH
EHS with the reform in 2013 are allowed to make use of 4,5% of their actual greenhouse gas emissions in
period 2013- 2020. This is consistent with the rules in the EU ETS (Hintermann and Gronwald, 2019).
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Figure 5: Overall cap, free allocation and emissions in the CH EHS
As no secondary allowance market has emerged, the auctions have remained the sole
source of a price signal. Figure 6 shows the clearing prices for CHUs, along with the
market price for allowances in the EU ETS. The prices were not visibly correlated until
recently. This can likely be explained by the uncertainty surrounding the link, and by the
absence of a secondary market, which resulted in significant transactions costs to exploit
any price differences between CHUs and EUAs.
In 2017, the CH EHS was formally evaluated by the Swiss Federal Audit Office (SFAO,
2017) and found to be over-allocated in terms of emission allowances and plagued by low
liquidity. The resulting allowance price was deemed too low to induce firms to engage
in meaningful abatement activities. In addition, the report criticised the uncertainty of
the eventual link to the EU ETS and the fact that the CH EHS was simply too small to
remain in autarky. Despite these shortcomings, however, we note that emissions in the
CH EHS did decrease over time, as can be seen in Fig 5. In 2018, the total emissions
within the CH EHS were 17 % lower than in 2013.
2.4 Cantonal regulation
Swiss cantons have a far-reaching regulatory autonomy. However, to facilitate the pro-
cesses that involve more than one canton (such as the planning of buildings and production
13
Figure 6: Evolution of the CHU and EUA prices; Source: https://www.
emissionsregistry.admin.ch and Thomson Reuters Eikon.
processes), the cantonal governments have agreed on a “lowest common denominator” for
energy policy. This basic compromise is known as the “large user model” (Grossver-
brauchermodell in German, or GVM) and states that all cantons should regulate plants
that use more than 5 GWh of heat input and/or 0.5 GWh of electricity per year.15 Firms
can choose one of three pathways to implement the GVM: (1) work out energy efficiency
measures with EnAW or Swiss Cleantech, just like nonEHS plants (see above); (2) develop
an agreement with the canton in which they operate; and (3) carry out an energy audit.
The GVM does not focus on emissions but on energy efficiency, and in particular on
electricity use. The overlap with the CH EHS is therefore limited. Furthermore, most
cantons do not require very stringent energy efficiency measures in order not to disadvan-
tage “their” firms relative to competitors in other cantons and abroad. Nevertheless, it
is possible that firms in the CH EHS have reduced emissions, among other reasons, due
to the measures developed under the GVM. To control for a potential direct impact of
cantonal regulation, we include a dummy that denotes active regulation subject to the
GVM (and which is zero otherwise) in our regressions. This dummy only applies to EHS
15More information about the GVM can be found at https://www.endk.ch/de/
energiepolitik-der-kantone/grossverbrauchermodell.
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plants, as all nonEHS plants fulfill the GVM criterion by construction.
3 Methodology and data
In this section, we first describe our identification strategy and then present the data.
3.1 Research design
Our design exploits that despite the name change, the main parameters of the nonEHS
program have remained stable since its introduction in 2008, and that many of the firms
currently in the CH EHS used to be in the nonEHS program. We estimate the differential
effect of these two programs using a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach. The con-
trol group consists of the firms that have remained in the nonEHS program throughout,
whereas the treatment firms are those that were transferred from the nonEHS program
to the CH EHS in the beginning of 2013. Since inclusion into the EHS was mandatory,
the treatment is arguably exogenous.16
Comparing the emissions in the two groups allows for a causal identification of the
differential effect. The individual effects of each program are not identified, but these
can be approximated by means of the studies defined above. Furthermore, knowing the
differential effect between a subsidy program and a cap-and-trade program is interesting
in its own right. Based on the higher financial incentive for emissions reductions, we
would expect the nonEHS to have a larger effect on emissions.
Our base specification consists of a difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis of the log of
emissions, such that we measure which group reduced emissions by a larger proportion.
We estimate the following equation:
eit = ci + ct + α ·DiDit + εit , (1)
16As discussed above, four plants opted into the CH EHS even though they did not meet the mandatory
inclusion requirement. However, these plants belong to firms that owned other plants for which inclusion
in the EHS was mandatory. Presumably, the transactions costs of being part of two separate programs
was deemed sufficiently large for these firms to opt all their plants into the system. This does not negate
our assumption that, taken on its own, the nonEHS is the more attractive program due to the presence
of the abatement subsidy.
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where eit refers to the natural logarithm of CO2 emissions, ci to a firm-level fixed effect,
ct to a vector of yearly dummies and εit is an i.i.d. error term. The coefficient of interest
is α, which multiplies the difference-in-difference term DiDit ≡ Dt · Di, where Di refers
to the treatment group dummy and Dt to the treatment period dummy. We allow the
errors to be correlated within observations belonging to the same firm (which may own
several plants), but not across firms.
To investigate a potential effect heterogeneity across plants, we allow the treatment
effect to vary across pre-treatment characteristics Z0i:
eit = ci + ct + α ·DiDit + γ ·DiDit · Z0i + εit (2)
In Z0i, we include the same information that we use for matching, but also additional
variables that could impact the effect of the treatment. Rather than continuous variables,
we will use dummies denoting bins of the distribution, such that the treatment effect for
a particular bin will be given by α + γ.
In addition to a simple comparison of (log) means, we employ a matched-control anal-
ysis similar in spirit to Fowlie et al. (2012) and Wagner et al. (2014), where we compare
treated firms to control firms that are similar with respect to pre-treatment characteris-
tics. We match exactly on the 1-digit industry classification,17 as well as parametrically
on the pre-treatment level of revenue, employment and capital. To control for potentially
different trajectories of abatement over time, even in the absence of any treatment, we also
match on the proportional emissions reduction during the pre-treatment period. Because
there may be anticipation effects, we only use information from the years 2008-2011 for
matching, while excluding the year 2012 (more about this below).
We start by matching to the nearest neighbor without replacement, where we allow for
error clustering on the matched pairs. To test for the robustness of the results, we also
engage in matching with replacement, in which we vary the number of matched control
plants per treated plant between 1 and 5 and bootstrap the standard errors.
17Exact matching on 2 digits would lead to very few matched observations, given our sample size.
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3.2 Data
Total reported emissions from firms in the nonEHS and EHS programs in the period
2008-2012 are available from the public reports published in the Swiss Emissions Trading
Registry.18 However, emissions reported for the period 2008-2012 are not directly compa-
rable with emissions reported since 2013, for the following reasons. First and foremost,
the perimeter of the covered emissions has changed. During 2018-2012, only the emis-
sions from eight ”standard” fuels were considered,19 but since 2013, a number of process
emissions (e.g., in the production of cement and steel) and waste emissions have also been
included. To make the data comparable, we computed plant emissions from the eight
standard fuels for the entire sample period.
Second, emissions of CO2 equivalents are not measured but calculated based on the
fuel (or process) inputs. The emission factors applied to calculate the CO2eq. emissions
were last updated in 2017, and we apply these for the entire sample period (EZV, 2018).
Third, emissions from purchased heat have been counted as the heat producers’ emis-
sions since 2013, but had been assigned to the buyer before that. To circumvent this
problem, we identify the emissions associated with the heat purchases in 2008-2012 and
associate them with the producers throughout our sample period.
Last, plants are allowed to participate in groups in both the CH EHS and the nonEHS
program. Some of these groups dissolved with the policy change, whereas new groups
were formed in 2013. To make a comparison possible, we aggregate the emissions to the
largest group level before and after 2013. To make these adjustments, we had to rely
on the expertise of FOEN staff. The adjusted dataset with the comparable emissions
perimeter before and after 2013 is confidential information provided to us by FOEN.
We complement the emissions data with information on employment, capital and rev-
enue from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database. These data are used only for matching
purposes, such that we focus on the pre-treatment period. The Orbis data are on the
firm-level. To assign the quantities to individual plants, we used additional information
18For more information on allocation, surrendering obligation, surrendered units and issued attesta-
tions, visit https://www.emissionsregistry.admin.ch.
19These are lignite, hard coal, propane, butane, natural gas, gas-oil, extra light fuel oil, medium/heavy
heating oil and coke.
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from business reports. Where no such information is available, we simply divide the
firm-level information equally among the number of plants.
Table 2: Summary statistics
Observations Emissions Revenue Employees Capital Offsets
(Nr.) (Mt CO2/y) (million CHF/y) (Full-time eq.) (million CHF/y) (Mt CO2)
All plants 2,332 8.043 429.124 923 13.831 9.415
Treated 286
2008-2012 130 51.398 2,343.757 5,586 67.517 48.907
2013-2018 156 41.593 2,398.359 5,485 76.306 -
Control 2,046
2008-2012 930 2.929 131.137 252 4.819 3.895
2013-2018 1,116 2.406 135.489 223 4.861 -
Notes: Offsets correspond to the total amount of over-abatement sold to CCF and KliK
generated during 2008-2012.
Table 2 presents summary statistics of our 26 treated and 186 control plants (or group
of plants, if participating jointly) over the eleven-year period. The EHS plants are signif-
icantly larger in all dimensions. Constant differences are accounted for by the plant-level
fixed effects and therefore pose no problem for identification, but we have to account for
the possibility that very emission-intensive firms may have different abatement trajecto-
ries than firms for which emissions account for only a small share of total costs. This is
the reason for including the proportional reduction of emissions during the pre-treatment
years among our matching variables (see above).
Average annual emissions of the treated and control plants are shown in Figure 7,
with and without matching on observable characteristics. The treatment is denoted by a
vertical line in the year 2013. Because the emission levels differ significantly between the
two groups, we plot the emission trends on different axes.
The figure highlights two important facts. First, matching matters. The trends prior
to 2013 are much more similar once we condition on pre-treatment characteristics. When
interpreting our findings, we will therefore place more weight on the results from the
matched analysis. Second, the year 2012 is special in the sense that the treatment group
temporarily increased its emissions relative to the control plants.20 To avoid creating
20This is confirmed in a regression analysis: Adding an interaction between the year-2012-dummy and
the control group dummy leads to a positive and statistically significant coefficient. The temporary surge
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a bias from such anticipation effects, we exclude the year 2012 from our analysis. The
average treatment effect that we estimate will therefore be based on a comparison of the
years 2008-2011 (pre-treatment) and the years 2013-2018 (post-treatment).
Figure 7: Emissions before (left) and after (right) matching
4 Results
Table 3 presents the results from estimating equation (1). In the first column, we do not
include plant fixed-effects but instead control for pre-treatment observable characteristics
and industry dummies. In addition to the variables used for matching, we also include the
level of pre-treatment emissions and the number of offsets generated during 2008-2012.
We also include a dummy denoting cantonal regulation.
in emissions for plants that joined the CH EHS in 2013 could be due to various reasons. For example,
firms could have increased their emissions in order to obtain more free allocation, or to “use up” their
surplus accumulated during the previous years in the belief that it could not be transferred into the
treatment period. These hypotheses require an assumption of imperfect information, as free allocation
was not based on emissions in 2012, and firms could in fact sell their over-abatement from 2008-2012
even in the post-treatment years. However, this may not have been clear for all firms.
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Plant emissions increase with the average level of pre-treatment emissions and revenue,
whereas the effect of the other variables is not significant at p<0.05. However, this regres-
sion may be influenced by omitted variables that drive emissions, and which are correlated
with observed plant characteristics. To control for (constant) unobserved heterogeneity,
we include plant-level fixed effects in all other regressions.
Table 3: Treatment effect (full sample and matched sample)
Dependent Variable: Emissions in tons of CO2 in logs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
no matching no matching NN w./o. repl. N3N w. repl. N5N w.repl.
DiD 0.036 -0.071 0.108 0.157 0.114
(0.797) (0.632) (0.368) (0.129) (0.220)
Emissions ave. 0.962***
(0.000)
Emissions trend 0.270**
(0.045)
Revenue 0.063***
(0.001)
Capital -0.019
(0.276)
Employment -0.059***
(0.007)
Offsets -0.005
(0.270)
Cantonal regulation 0.115
(0.420)
Industry dummies 3 7 7 7 7
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3
Firm FE 7 3 3 3 3
Obs. 1515 2066 433 568 727
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. (1) and (2): Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the firm
level. (3): Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the matched-pair level. (4) and (5): Standard errors (in
parentheses) are obtained through bootstrapping (500 replications). “Emissions trend” refers to the (log) difference of
emissions in 2010-2011 and 2008-2009. “Offsets” refers to the ratio between the offsets generated by over-abatement and
plants’ total emissions during 2008-2012.
Column (2) presents the result from a difference-in-differences estimation involving all
plants. In columns 3-6, we compare treated with matched control firms based on various
forms of matching. In all regressions, the estimate for average treatment effect is not
statistically significant from zero. This is surprising, given the very different financial
incentives for abatement in these two programs.
Figure 8 shows the results in the format of an event study. We see that the average
treatment effect is far from being significant in all years, and that there are no pre-
treatment effects in the years 2008-2011.
To investigate whether the absence of an overall effect masks heterogeneous responses
by different types of plants, we interact the DiD term with pre-treatment information
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Figure 8: Event Study
as specified in eq. (2). We present the results from including dummies, rather than
continuous variables, which facilitates the interpretation of the coefficients. Specifically,
we create dummies that take the value of one if a plant exhibits an above-median value
for a particular pre-treatment variable, and zero otherwise.
The results from this analysis are presented in Table 4. All regressions in this table
are based on nearest-neighbor matching without replacement. The results for regressions
based on different methods of matching (including no matching) are included in Tables
A.1-A.4 in the appendix. The method of matching does affect the results. The appendix
also contains the results from including continuous pre-treatment variables (rather than
dummmies) in Table A.5.
Columns (1)-(6) individually include seven dummies corresponding to the six pre-
treatment variables. For some specifications, the treatment effect is positive and signifi-
cant for plants that exhibit below-median values for the respective pre-treatment variable
(offsets, average emissions and revenue). The treatment effect for plants with above-
median values is the sum of the coefficients on the DiD term and on the interaction term,
which is not statistically significant for any column.
We also interact the DiD term with a dummy for (post-treatment) cantonal regulation
(column 7). The results indicate that the treatment effect is not driven by the cantonal
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regulation, as both the coefficient on the DiD term and its sum with the interaction
coefficient is not significant. This indicates that the abatement on behalf of CH EHS is
not due to cantonal regulation.
Table 4: Treatment effect (matched sample)
Dependent Variable: Emissions in tons of CO2 in logs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Matching without replacement
DiD 0.265** 0.237* 0.020 0.216* 0.177 0.085 0.068 0.379*** 0.373***
(0.035) (0.053) (0.872) (0.081) (0.122) (0.438) (0.668) (0.001) (0.001)
DiD x Offsets -0.317** -0.284* -0.318**
(0.030) (0.060) (0.020)
DiD x Emissions ave. -0.285* -0.090
(0.051) (0.467)
DiD x Emissions trend 0.173
(0.246)
DiD x Revenue -0.236 -0.197* -0.237*
(0.111) (0.089) (0.075)
DiD x Capital -0.150
(0.335)
DiD x Employment 0.046
(0.764)
DiD x Cantonal regulation 0.084
(0.512)
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Firm FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Obs. 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433
Note:* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the matched-pair level. The
interaction terms are dummies that take the value of one if a plant’s value exceeds the median, and zero otherwise.
The individual inclusion of pre-treatment variables serves to identify potential effect
modifiers, but the coefficients may reflect the effect of more than one determinant since
the pre-treatment dummies are correlated. For example, plants with high pre-treatment
emissions also tend to generate more offsets and generate more revenue. To address
this, we jointly include those variables for which the interaction terms are individually
significant at p<0.2 (which are also the ones for which the coefficient on the DiD term is
significant at p<0.1). The results from this joint regression are shown in column (8). The
coefficients imply that the treatment effect varies with the level of generated offsets (i.e.,
over-abatement) and revenue during the pre-treatment years. In contrast, the coefficient
on the interaction term for pre-treatment emissions becomes insignificant.
In column (9), we re-estimate this model using only the significant interaction terms.
This creates four groups within the treated plants, defined over their levels of over-
abatement and revenue in the pre-treatment period: HH (high offsets and revenue); HL
(high offsets, low revenue); LH (low offsets, high revenue); and LL (low offsets and rev-
22
enue). As it turns out, the level of revenue and over-abatement are not strongly correlated,
such that the treated plants are quite evenly distributed across these four groups.
We can now discuss the treatment effect for each of these four groups. The treatment
effect for the LL group is given by the coefficient on the DiD term alone, which is positive
and statistically significant. The treatment effect for the HL group consists of the sum
of the coefficient on the DiD term and the coefficient on the offset interaction term; the
treatment effect for the LH group is the sum of the coefficient on DiD and the interaction
term with revenue; and the treatment effect on the HH group is formed by the sum of all
three coefficients. The effect for none of the groups involving a high level of any variable
is statistically significantly different from zero.21
One interpretation of our results is the following: Firms do respond to financial incen-
tives for abatement, which is the reason for the positive treatment effect for group LL.
However, there may be reasons other than money that induce firms to reduce their emis-
sions. For example, some firms may want to develop (or maintain) a “green” image, which
could lead them to value emission abatement in its own right. As a consequence, they en-
gage in abatement in excess of equating their marginal abatement costs with the allowance
price. The extent of offsets generated by over-abatement during the pre-treatment phase
could proxy for such green preferences. In other words, firms that abated emissions above
and beyond what they needed to do by law continue to do so under the EHS regime,
whereas those that just did the minimum respond to the lower financial incentive in the
EHS by reducing their abatement effort.
A possible explanation underlying the effect involving revenue could be that firms
generating a lot of cash flow can afford to engage in more stringent abatement measures
than firms that are more cash-constrained.
21For group HL, the treatment effect (with standard error in parenthesis) is 0.093 (0.132). For groups
LH and HH, the corresponding values are 0.134 (0.132) and -0.169 (0.191), respectively.
23
5 Conclusions
We find that the nonEHS program leads to significant costs in terms of lost revenue
and abatement subsidies payments, but it is not clear that it leads to a higher level of
emissions reduction than a regular ETS. This raises the question of whether this money
is well spent. Furthermore, one of the advantages of market-based instruments (such as
taxes and cap-and-trade systems) is that they do not require individual information about
firms’ abatement costs, which tend to be private. The command-and-control component
of the nonEHS program, on the other hand, very much relies on firm-specific information.
The current system provides incentives for firms to over-state their abatement costs and
thus under-state their abatement opportunities. If successful, such a strategy would enable
firms to cheaply over-achieve their goals and be compensated for this at a rate of CHF
100/tCO2. We have no way of measuring whether this is indeed the case; we merely note
that the system is not robust to the strategic use of private information by firms.
There is an ongoing political discussion in Switzerland about whether the scope of
the nonEHS program should be broadened to include more plants, e.g., by lowering the
inclusion threshold in terms of annual emissions. To the extent that the current tax of
CHF 96 per tCO2 can be expected to have at least as strong an effect as an ETS with an
allowance price on the order of CHF 10, we would not expect that moving firms from the
CO2 levy into the nonEHS program will result in additional emissions reductions. This
is true a fortiori given that the tax is scheduled to increase further in the future.
Proponents of the nonEHS program argue that it some of its chief benefits lie in
“bringing emissions into the boardroom”, and that the collaboration with specialized
agencies informs firms about possible abatement measures that they otherwise would not
have identified. However, it is not clear why rational firm managers should care more
about earning CHF 100 than about saving a tax of CHF 96 per per tCO2. In fact, the
concept of loss aversion would indicate that firms will do more to reduce losses than to
realize gains (Kahneman et al., 1991). Furthermore, nothing stops a firm from using the
advisory services of the specialized agencies even if it is not part of the nonEHS program,
as the prospect of saving the CO2 levy should be incentive enough to become informed
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about effective abatement measures. Many of the firms that have developed abatement
measures in cooperation with EnAW and ACT are not exempt from the levy.
If Switzerland (along with other countries) is to significantly reduce its GHG emissions,
the burden of this effort should be spread across many shoulders. Exempting additional
firms from the CO2 levy shifts the incidence of climate policy towards households and
the remaining firms. This is not equitable, and our results imply that it may not lead to
more abatement either.
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A Additional Tables and Figures
Figure A.1: Event study graph with the year 2012 included
Table A.1: Heterogeneous treatment effects without matching
Dependent Variable: Emissions in tons of CO2 in logs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Matching without replacement
DiD -0.114 0.096 -0.210 0.213** 0.174* 0.070 -0.036 0.180 0.169
(0.674) (0.558) (0.373) (0.037) (0.053) (0.801) (0.705) (0.277) (0.318)
DiD x Offsets 0.086 0.162 0.088
(0.762) (0.637) (0.745)
DiD x Emissions ave. -0.334 -0.191
(0.221) (0.590)
DiD x Emissions trend 0.275
(0.330)
DiD x Revenue -0.529** -0.439* -0.529**
(0.040) (0.068) (0.042)
DiD x Capital -0.456*
(0.080)
DiD x Employment -0.263
(0.317)
DiD x Cantonal Regulation -0.075
(0.758)
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Firm FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Obs. 2066 2066 2066 2066 2066 2066 2066 2066 2066
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the firm level.
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Table A.2: Heterogeneous treatment effect with nearest 1-neighbor matching
Dependent Variable: Emissions in tons of CO2 in logs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Matching without replacement
DiD 0.316*** 0.288** 0.071 0.267** 0.228* 0.136 0.106 0.430*** 0.424***
(0.007) (0.025) (0.595) (0.046) (0.062) (0.283) (0.555) (0.001) (0.002)
DiD x Offsets -0.317** -0.284* -0.318**
(0.022) (0.057) (0.017)
DiD x Emissions ave. -0.285* -0.090
(0.043) (0.523)
DiD x Emissions trend 0.174
(0.233)
DiD x Revenue -0.236 -0.196 -0.237*
(0.104) (0.113) (0.077)
DiD x Capital -0.150
(0.346)
DiD x Employment 0.046
(0.768)
DiD x Cantonal Regulation 0.092
(0.464)
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Firm FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Obs. 383 383 383 383 383 383 383 383 383
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Matching performed with replacement. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
obtained through bootstrapping (500 replications).
Table A.3: Heterogeneous treatment effect with nearest 3-neighbor matching
Dependent Variable: Emissions in tons of CO2 in logs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Matching without replacement
DiD 0.314*** 0.286** 0.068 0.264** 0.225** 0.134 0.104 0.428*** 0.422***
(0.003) (0.021) (0.545) (0.030) (0.045) (0.178) (0.554) (0.000) (0.000)
DiD x Offsets -0.318** -0.285* -0.319**
(0.022) (0.069) (0.013)
DiD x Emissions ave. -0.285* -0.090
(0.050) (0.526)
DiD x Emissions trend 0.175
(0.218)
DiD x Revenue -0.235 -0.196 -0.236*
(0.109) (0.134) (0.074)
DiD x Capital -0.149
(0.345)
DiD x Employment 0.047
(0.758)
DiD x Cantonal Regulation 0.098
(0.440)
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Firm FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Obs. 568 568 568 568 568 568 568 568 568
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Matching performed with replacement. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
obtained through bootstrapping (500 replications).
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Table A.4: Heterogeneous treatment effect with nearest 5-neighbor matching
Dependent Variable: Emissions in tons of CO2 in logs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Matching without replacement
DiD 0.271*** 0.243** 0.025 0.221** 0.182* 0.091 0.061 0.385*** 0.379***
(0.003) (0.019) (0.817) (0.043) (0.059) (0.343) (0.694) (0.000) (0.000)
DiD x Offsets -0.317** -0.285* -0.318**
(0.022) (0.066) (0.012)
DiD x Emissions ave. -0.285** -0.090
(0.050) (0.519)
DiD x Emissions trend 0.174
(0.255)
DiD x Revenue -0.235* -0.197* -0.237*
(0.091) (0.092) (0.065)
DiD x Capital -0.150
(0.351)
DiD x Employment 0.046
(0.762)
DiD x Cantonal Regulation 0.086
(0.489)
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Firm FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Obs. 727 727 727 727 727 727 727 727 727
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Matching performed with replacement. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
obtained through bootstrapping (500 replications).
Table A.5: Heterogeneous treatment effects with continuous variables
Dependent Variable: Emissions in tons of CO2 in logs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Matching without replacement
DiD 0.265** 1.833*** 0.108 1.163 0.510* 0.227 1.976*** 1.307*
(0.041) (0.002) (0.369) (0.209) (0.062) (0.257) (0.008) (0.088)
DiD x OffsetsC -0.029** -0.022* -0.029**
(0.045) (0.066) (0.032)
DiD x EmissionsC -0.174*** -0.122**
(0.006) (0.037)
DiD x EmissionsDiffC 0.031
(0.940)
DiD x RevenueC -0.088 -0.045 -0.087
(0.243) (0.476) (0.166)
DiD x CapitalC -0.049
(0.158)
DiD x EmploymentC -0.022
(0.523)
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Firm FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Obs. 433 433 433 433 433 433 433 433
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Nearest-neighbor matching without replacement, as in Table 4. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the matched-pair level.
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